Universal Rights, Uneven Impacts: The Domestic Politics of Treaty Incorporation
Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press
When a state joins a human rights treaty, it must incorporate its international treaty obligations into domestic law by creating domestic regulations and legislation that match the international standards. Why do some treaty members change their domestic laws to align them with treaty standards, while other members do not? I theorize that incorporation—the adoption of specific treaty provisions containing human rights standards into domestic laws—results from political battles between competing domestic interest groups. Most political science research emphasizes how civil society advocates use human rights treaties to hold governments accountable for rights violations. In contrast, I argue that many human rights treaties activate social conflict over distribution or competing moral values. These conflicts spur interest groups to pressure governments both in favor of and against treaty incorporation. Consequently, governments that face competing pressures from international and domestic interest groups often fail to incorporate international treaties. I test this argument by examining legislation adopted in Latin America to incorporate treaties against child labor and marriage. I analyze two original datasets of the national legislation adopted in the region to prohibit these practices, including the loopholes that provide exceptions to the human rights standards. I complement these analyses with qualitative evidence from over 60 in-depth interviews with policymakers, civil society leaders, and representatives of international organizations in six Latin American countries. The book has significant implications for the fields of international law, human rights, and transnational activism and valuable lessons for those in the field working to improve respect for human rights around the world.
Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press
When a state joins a human rights treaty, it must incorporate its international treaty obligations into domestic law by creating domestic regulations and legislation that match the international standards. Why do some treaty members change their domestic laws to align them with treaty standards, while other members do not? I theorize that incorporation—the adoption of specific treaty provisions containing human rights standards into domestic laws—results from political battles between competing domestic interest groups. Most political science research emphasizes how civil society advocates use human rights treaties to hold governments accountable for rights violations. In contrast, I argue that many human rights treaties activate social conflict over distribution or competing moral values. These conflicts spur interest groups to pressure governments both in favor of and against treaty incorporation. Consequently, governments that face competing pressures from international and domestic interest groups often fail to incorporate international treaties. I test this argument by examining legislation adopted in Latin America to incorporate treaties against child labor and marriage. I analyze two original datasets of the national legislation adopted in the region to prohibit these practices, including the loopholes that provide exceptions to the human rights standards. I complement these analyses with qualitative evidence from over 60 in-depth interviews with policymakers, civil society leaders, and representatives of international organizations in six Latin American countries. The book has significant implications for the fields of international law, human rights, and transnational activism and valuable lessons for those in the field working to improve respect for human rights around the world.